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Abstract—Most recent studies on establishing intersection
safety focus on the situation where all vehicles are fully au-
tonomous. However, currently most vehicles are human-driven
and so we will need to transition through regimes featuring
a varying proportion of human-driven vehicles ranging from
100% to 0% before realizing such a fully autonomous future
– if ever. We will therefore need to address the safety of
hybrid systems featuring an arbitrary mixture of human-driven
and autonomous vehicles. In fact recent incidents involving
autonomous vehicles have already highlighted the need to study
the safety of autonomous vehicles co-existing with human-driven
vehicles. Motivated by this we address the design of provably safe
intersection management for mixed traffic consisting of a mix
of human-driven vehicles (HVs) as well as autonomous vehicles
(AVs).
To analyze such mixed traffic, we model HVs as nearsighted
and with relatively loose constraints, permitting worst-case be-
havior while AVs are considered as capable of following much
tighter constraints. HVs are allowed freedom to change their
speed at any time while AVs are only allowed to change
their speed at the beginning of a time slot through a Model
Predictive Controller (MPC). AVs are assumed to possess a
shorter response time and stronger braking capability than HVs
in collision avoidance. Moreover, AVs obtain the permissions of
passing through the intersection through vehicle-to-infrastructure
(V2I) communication, while HVs achieve the same objective by
following traffic lights.
Taking the above differences into consideration, we propose
a provably safe intersection management for mixed traffic
comprised of an MPC-based protocol for AVs, a permission
assignment policy for AVs along with a coordination protocol
for traffic lights. In order to respect the distinctiveness of HVs,
the proposed protocol ensures that the traffic lights as well
as the semantic meanings of their colors are consistent with
current practice. A formal proof of safety of the system under
the proposed combined protocol is provided.
Index Terms—Intelligent transportation system, autonomous
vehicle, intelligent intersection, mixed traffic.
I. INTRODUCTION
According to the European Union community road accident
database CARE, intersection related fatalities account for more
than 20% of the fatalities in the European Union during
2001-2010 [1]. Similarly in the US, 40% of the crashes
and 21.5% of the traffic fatalities are intersection related [2].
Autonomous vehicles (AVs) have been regarded as being able
to mitigate this issue. Their technology has been advancing
thanks to many related projects, e.g., the ITS program in the
US, the EUREKA Prometheus Project in European Union,
the ITS initiative program in Japan and the Self-Driving Car
Project by Google. In the 2007 DARPA Urban Challenge,
six out of 32 AVs completed the race, indicating feasibil-
ity of fully autonomous driving in urban environment [3].
Besides, supportive standards and laws have been adopted
for AVs clearing their way to enter the market. To support
communication, the IEEE Wireless Access for Vehicle Envi-
ronment (WAVE) standard and IEEE 802.11p based Directed
Short Range Communication (DSRC) standards for vehicle-to-
vehicle (V2V) communication [4] and vehicle-to-infrastructure
(V2I) communications [5] have been developed. Testing of
AVs has been legally permitted on public roads in California,
Michigan, Florida, Nevada, Arizona, North Dakota, Tennessee,
and the District of Columbia [6].
For the reasons discussed above, intersection safety with
autonomous vehicles has received growing research attention.
However, most recent studies focus on establishing intersec-
tion safety in the context that all vehicles passing through
the intersection are fully autonomous, i.e., all vehicles have
computation capability, are able to negotiate with one an-
other, or receive instructions from a centralized controller.
Provable safety is attained in [7] through assigning AVs non-
overlapping time slots for accessing the intersection to avoid
collisions. This assignment is accomplished by assuming that
all vehicles have GPS, V2I communication, in-vehicle sensing
and computation. More strictly, in [8, 9] only one AV or
platooning is allowed to enter the intersection per time. The
order to enter is obtained via V2I communication. Similarly,
safety is improved in [10] by preventing pairs of conflicting
AVs from approaching their cross-collision point at the same
time. This prevention mechanism requires that all vehicles are
equipped with V2I communication and a computation module.
In [11, 12], a higher requirement is imposed on vehicles: all of
them are able to access the system state through wireless com-
munication while solving Model Predictive Control (MPC)
based optimization problems. In [13], intersection safety is
attained by AVs sequentially solve optimization problems with
the solution of previous AVs being passed to succeeding AVs
as additional constraints through V2V communication.
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The fraction of AVs in present traffic is negligibly small
and it is predicted that by 2030, only 50% of vehicles will
be autonomous [14]. Therefore there may be a long transition
period, during which a mix of HVs as well as AVs share
the same intersection. So far, however, there has been little
rigorous attention to safe intersection management in mixed
traffic (a review is given in Section II). Moreover, it is very
difficult to extend studies on homogeneous traffic to mixed
traffic as AVs and HVs are significantly different. First, HVs
are operated by human drivers and thus ought to have the
freedom to change speed at any time. In comparison, AVs are
usually controlled by controllers that are only able to adjust
control inputs at the beginning of each time slot. Second,
human drivers should not be expected to follow complex
commands, while AVs are considered as capable of following
much tighter constraints. Third, with respect to braking to
avoid collision, human drivers may be unable to response
as quickly as AVs. Finally, AVs learn about each other’s in-
tentions through V2V communication and receive commands
from intersections through V2I communication, while human
drivers achieve the same goal by reading signaling lights on
other vehicle, such as turn signals, and intersection traffic
lights.
Motivated by the issues presented above, we address the
design of provably safe intersection management for mixed
traffic consisting of a mix of HVs as well as AVs. This
paper continues our work on single-lane and multi-lane traffic
[15]–[17], and is apparently the first to address provably
safe intersection management for mixed traffic under above
considerations.
Contributions The contributions of our work can be summa-
rized as follows.
• A novel intersection management is proposed for mixed
traffic consisting of a mix of HVs and AVs. The man-
agement maximally respect the habits of human drivers
in current practice.
• HVs and AVs are represented by different models that
capture their differences in control freedom, command
complexity, braking response capability, and communi-
cation capability.
• The proposed management takes into account the differ-
ence between AVs and HVs.
• A formal proof for the safety of the proposed manage-
ment is provided.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we provide a brief summary of related work in intersection
management for mixed traffic. In Section III, we present our
models of intersections, HVs and AVs. Intersection manage-
ment for mixed traffic in combination with a coordination
protocol for traffic lights is investigated in Section IV, and
subsequently, a formal proof of safety is provided. Concluding
remarks follow in Section V.
II. RELATED WORKS
Very few studies have investigated intersection management
for mixed traffic consisting both AVs and HVs. In [18], mixed
traffic is proposed to be managed through redeploying existing
infrastructure-traffic lights. As separate traffic light is assumed
to be responsible for each lane, each lane is successively
granted with a green light during a small portion of time while
HVs in other lanes are stopped by red lights. A formal proof on
system safety is missing. In [19], an HV is viewed as a virtual
AV. Every time an HV arrives, the intersection reserves an
exclusive time for it, and is informed of its right-of-way by the
human-dedicated traffic lights. This design faces difficulties
since it imposes additional constraints on traffic lights and
lane infrastructure. In [20], AVs are controlled to respect
priority-preserving order provided by intersection, while for
HVs, the intersection is responsible to create a virtual request,
process it and inform them through traffic lights. However,
when there are low-priority AVs in front, HVs are blocked
out of the intersection in spite the green traffic lights leading
to a mismatch with human driver expectations. The study also
does not model the differences between AVs and HVs except
for their communication capabilities. In [21, 22] intersection
management is investigated for “semi-autonomous” vehicles,
i.e., vehicles that support control-input override and V2I
communication. Safety is guaranteed by allowing intersection
to override control inputs from human drivers when they
would result in an unsafe or blocked situation, which presents
difficulties in current practice as most present HVs does not
support such functions.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In the context of mixed traffic, intersection modeling and
vehicle modeling are expected to fully respect the differences
between AVs and HVs, while avoiding unnecessary changes to
current infrastructure. The differences between AVs and HVs
can be summarized as below aspects.
1) Control freedom: HVs have the freedom to change a
control input at any time, while AVs are only able to
adjust control input at periodic discrete times.
2) Command complexity: HVs should not be expected to
follow complex commands, whereas AVs are viewed as
able to follow tighter constraints and complex protocols.
3) Braking response capability: HVs cannot brake as hard
as AVs. HVs are unable to response as quickly as AVs.
4) Communication capability: AVs can communicate with
each through V2V communication and with the intersec-
tion bidirectionally by V2I communication, while HVs
can only read signal lights on vehicles and intersections
“unidirectionally”, where “unidirectionally” here means
that HVs cannot directly send any acknowledgement or
talk to intersections.
A. Intersection Modeling
We consider a general intersection scenario as shown in Fig.
1. We assume vehicles follow legal paths represented by solid
curves. Paths are numbered, and intersect at several “conflict
points”. Around each conflict point, a small area accounting
for the length of a vehicle is defined and represented by a
solid circle referred to as a “collision area”. One target of
safe intersection management is to prevent two vehicles in one
system from entering the same collision area simultaneously.
Our intersection model allows for the case that a lane supports
more than one traffic flow, e.g., “straight” and “right-turn”.
Consequently, a vehicle with permission may fail to enter the
intersection if it is blocked by a vehicle ahead that is still
waiting a permission. Although Fig. 1 shows three lanes for
each in-road, the proposed scheme extends to more general
scenarios, where the first l1 lanes are “left-turn only”, the next
l2 lanes are “left-turn or straight”, the next l3 lanes are “straight
only”, the next l4 lanes are “straight or right-turn”, and the last
l5 lanes are “right only”.
Fig. 1. General intersection scenario with crossing, merging, and non-
conflicting paths
In Fig. 1, we denote the area inside the intersection by AI ,
entering which will be referred to as “entering the intersec-
tion”. Supposing the range of reliable V2I communication to
be dC , we denote by AC the area that is within a distance
dC from AI . AVs are expected to stay connected with the
intersection inside area AC ∪ AI . Unlike AVs, HVs plan
their motion through the intersection through traffic lights.
Motivated by this, we suppose that HVs within a distance
dH notice the color of the traffic light before entering AI . We
denote by AH the area within a distance dH of AI . Since dH
is line-of-sight, we assume dH < dC in Fig. 1. Given these
differences between HVs an AVs, our goal is to design an
intersection management scheme that avoids collision among
vehicles at any time and place in the intersection.
B. Vehicle Modeling
We model the motion of vehicles by a unicycle kinematic
model. As shown in Fig. 2, at time t, the state of vehicle c
is xt(c) := (xt(c), yt(c), θt(c))T , capturing its position and
orientation. Longitudinal deceleration is along the forward
direction and is denoted by a`t(c). Centripetal deceleration
Fig. 2. Illustration of the unicycle kinematic model for vehicle c. The solid
curve depicts the trajectory of the vehicle.
points to the turning center O and is denoted by aot , resulting
in an equivalent acceleration at(c) =
√
(a`t(c))
2 + (aot (c))
2.
ρt(c) denotes the predefined turning radius of c at position
pt(c), as defined by the predefined lane markers. The input
vector is ut := (vt(c), ωt(c)) denoting velocity control and
steering control. Where there is no scope for confusion we
omit the vehicle identifier c.
The physical constraints on the kinematic model are: (1)
vt ∈ [0, vmax]. (2) θt ∈ [θmin, θmax]. (3) |ρt| ∈ [ρmin,+∞).
(4) |ωt| ∈ [0, vmax/ρmin]; (5) ∆vt ∈ [aminh, amaxh]. Here
vmax ≥ 0 denotes the speed limit at the intersection, while
θmin < 0 and θmax > 0 correspond to the minimum
and maximum turning according to its angels. The quantity
amin < 0 denotes the most rapid deceleration, where amin =
−
√
(almin)
2 + (aomin)
2, almin < 0 is the maximum achievable
lateral deceleration (i.e., most rapid brake) and aomin < 0
is maximum achievable centripetal deceleration by vehicle
tires, amax > 0 is the maximum achievable acceleration,
i.e., maximum throttle, and the minimum turning radius along
trajectories.
Control signals for AVs are determined at the beginning of
each time slot [t, t+ h) and maintained constant during it. In
contract, control inputs for HVs are allowed to change at any
time. The kinematic equation of an vehicle is
xt+h := f(xt,ut). (1)
Then, for an AV when ωt 6= 0, we express f by
xt+h : = 2
vt
ωt
sin(
1
2
ωth) cos(θt +
1
2
ωth) + xt
yt+h : = 2
vt
ωt
sin(
1
2
ωth) sin(θt +
1
2
ωth) + yt
θt+h : = ωth+ θt,
and for ωt = 0, it is
xt+h : = vth cos(θt) + xt
yt+h : = vth sin(θt) + yt
θt+h : = θt.
For an HV:
xt+h : =
∫ h
0
v(t+ τ) cos(θt+τ )dτ + xt
yt+h : =
∫ h
0
v(t+ τ) sin(θt+τ )dτ + yt
θt+h : =
∫ h
0
ω(t+ τ)dτ + θt.
We allow different maximum achievable decelerations for
AVs and HVs, i.e., different lower bounds in the physical con-
straints on acceleration, and use a superscript “hv” and “av” to
differentiate them. Specifically, we allow ahvmin > a
av
min. We
also suppose that HVs may need longer response time Thvr
than AVs. We also suppose that AVs have the knowledge on
the type of nearby vehicles e.g., AV or HV, as they can confirm
the identity of each AV through V2V communication. HVs, in
contrast, are given the freedom to treat each nearby vehicle as
an HV. As a result each AV is expected to be responsible for
not colliding with vehicles, and, at the same time, behaving in
a manner similar to an HV when it is interacting with an HV.
By imposing such concern on AVs, we ensure that HVs do
not need to differentiate between the types of vehicles that are
following it. However, an AV must ensure that if it is followed
by an HV, then it should give enough response time to the
following HV and also take into account that it can at most
brake with ahvmin to avoid collision. The main contribution of
this paper including a series of our previous studies [15]–[17]
is to show how to integrate such a loose model of HVs and a
tight model of AVs safely in one system.
IV. METHODS
We consider the intersection management problem for
mixed traffic and establish its safety in this section. It is
challenging to design a safe intersection management scheme
for mixed traffic, due to the differences in control freedom,
command complexity and collision-avoidance capabilities be-
tween AVs and HVs. Moreover, AVs are expected to follow
instructions from the intersection while HVs are assumed to
follow signal lights for motion planning. Also, AVs are able
to behave like HVs and comply to signal lights as well.
Fig.3 illustrates the proposed architecture for intersection
management in mixed traffic. The Intersection Manager (IM)
is responsible for managing AVs such that they will not enter
the collision area at the same time as other vehicles. It collects
AV states and HV states through V2I communication and
road-side sensors, after they are within AC . Based on that
information, IM determines whether or not to grant pass-
through permission to an AV according to its “permission
assignment policy”. Similarly the Intersection Signal Light
Controller (ISL) controls the signal light color according to
Fig. 3. Architecture of intersection management for mixed traffic.
a “signal operation policy”. The color of the signal light is
observed visually after an HV enters AH .
TABLE I
ILLUSTRATION OF MARKS IN FIG.3
Mark Illustration
1© IM-ISL Coordination Protocol
2© Permission Assignment Policy
3© V2I Communication
4© Sensors
5© Signal Operation Policy
6© Motion Protocol
7© Simple Rules
8© V2V Communication, Sensors
9© Turning Lights
Since AVs and HVs follow different management policies,
but they interleave with each other along their paths, it is
critical to have coordination between IM and ISL. Otherwise,
an HV approaching the intersection may observe a green signal
light, but be blocked by AVs ahead of it whose requests were
denied. Also, the coordination needs to respect the uncertainty
of HVs’ understanding in signal lights as the communication
between HVs and the intersection is unidirectional, i.e., HVs
cannot directly send acknowledgement to or directly receive
certain permissions from intersections. For instance, all HVs
may observe a green signal light as they enter AH , even
though the ISL may only plan to permit a subset of them.
When the signal light changes, the remaining HVs may fail to
brake before AI and thus become “unplanned but permitted”
vehicles.
After receiving permission from the IM, AVs control their
movement through their motion protocol. The target of the
adjustment is to safely pass through the intersection. Mean-
while, AVs need to stay safe with respect to vehicles nearby by
taking into account their states and intentions. The states and
intention of nearby AVs are obtained through V2V commu-
nication and on-board sensors, while information of nearby
HVs are learnt through on-board sensors. In contrast, HVs
being operated by human drivers are not expected to follow as
complex commands and tighter constraints as AVs, and obtain
intentions of other vehicles through their turn signals. These
features are illustrated in Fig. 3 through the marks explained
in Tab I.
A. Safe Signal Operation for HVs
To respect the capability differences between HVs and AVs,
we propose a flexible traffic light operation approach, and,
correspondingly, very simple rules for HVs. The rules are easy
to follow and conform to the habits of human drivers in present
traffic. Denote by Γ the set of all paths in Fig. 1, and by γi the
path with index i. We suppose that except the right-turn paths
Γr = {γ1, γ5, γ9, γ13}, all other paths are managed by their
corresponding signal lights. A signal light may be allowed to
manage more than one path. For instance, γ2 and γ3 can be
managed by one signal light. Denote by `γ(t) the status of
signal light for path γ at time t, with `γ(t) ∈ {g, a, r}, where
g represents green, a amber, and r red. We use γi ∩ γj to
indicate the collision area between paths γi and γj . γi∩γj = ∅
indicates γi and γj are collision-free, e.g., γ2 and γ10. Denote
by pγ the cross-point of path γ and AI . If two vehicles ci and
cj are on the same path γ at time t, then the distance from ci to
cj along is denoted by dγ(pt(ci), pt(cj)). dγ(pt(ci), pt(cj)) >
0 if ci is following cj ; otherwise dγ(pt(ci), pt(cj)) < 0.
Now we specify signal operation policy.
Policy 1. Signal Operation Policy
Intersection signal lights are operated in such a way that
for any γ, `γ(t) cyclically changes from g to a to r
and back to g as t increases. Meanwhile, it respects two
constraints:
1) For any γi, if `γi(t) ∈ {g, a} then `γj (t) = r for
all γj ∈ Γi, where Γi = {γ ∈ Γ : γi ∩ γ 6= ∅}.That
is, when a path is green or amber, all its conflicting
paths are red.
2) for any γ ∈ Γ, suppose at some time t0, there exists
`γ(t0) = a, then `γ(t) 6= r for t > t0 as long
as some HV c along γ cannot stop before AI , i.e.
dγ(pt(c), pγ) < shv(vt(c), 0), where
shv(vt(c), 0) =
vt(c)
2
−2ahvmin
+ vmaxT
hv
r + smin.
That is, a path is held at amber for sufficiently long
time to allow HVs that cannot stop to pass through
the intersection.
It is easy to find a feasible solution that satisfies constraint (1).
In fact, most intersection signal lights in operation presently
satisfy constraint (1). Constraint (2) is also easy to satisfy as
the intersection knows HV states through road-side sensors.
Given the signal light state in the intersection, HVs are
expected to follow simple rules within AH . For simplicity,
we assume that dH ≥ shv(vmax, 0), i.e. if an HV observes a
red light when it enters AH with velocity vmax, it is still able
to stop before entering AI . Denote by Chv the set of all HVs
and Cav the set of all AVs. Given vehicle ci, we denote by
γ(ci) the path along with ci is moving. The set of vehicles
that are ahead of ci on γ(ci) at time t can be expressed as :
Ci(t) := {c ∈ Chv ∪ Cav : γ(c) = γ(ci)
∧dγ(c)(pt(ci), pt(c)) > 0}. (2)
To establish system-wide safety within the intersection, we
assume that HVs are able to follow their lead vehicles on
the same path while maintaining a safe separation distance.
This assumption is reasonable as otherwise, safety cannot be
established even in an intersection with only HVs. We will
show that it is enough for safety to follow the nearest lead
vehicle along its path with safe separation distance.
Now we specify the rules for HVs within AH .
Rules 1. Rules for HVs
A HV c ∈ Chv follows the following rules after entering
AH :
1) c follows the nearest lead vehicle cl maintaining
a safe separation distance, dγ(c)(pt(c), pt(cl)) ≥
shv(vt(c), vt(c
l)) at any t, where
shv(vt(c), vt(c
l)) :=
1(vt(c) > vt(c
l))
(vt(c))
2 − (vt(cl))2
−2ahvmin
+
vmaxT
hv
r + smin,
and smin ≥ 0 is a constant to take care of vehicle
size. The nearest lead vehicle is determined by
cl := arg min
c′∈Cc(t)
{dγ(c)(pt(c), pt(c′)) :
dγ(c)(pt(c), pt(c
′)) > 0}.
2) If γ(c) /∈ Γr, then c prepares to enter AI if the
following condition holds(
`γ(c)(t) = g
) ∨ (`γ(c)(t) = a
∧ dγ(c)(pt(c), pγ) < shv(vt(c), 0)
)
,
c prepares to stop before AI if below condition
holds
(`γ(c)(t) = r) ∨
(
`γ(c)(t) = a
∧ dγ(c)(pt(c), pγ) ≥ shv(vt(c), 0)
)
.
3) If γ(c) ∈ Γr, then c prepares to enter AI at time t
if 1) is satisfied and the following condition holds:
denote by γ the only conflicted path of γ(c)
dγ(pt(c
r), pγ) ≥ shv(vt(cr)− ahvminh, 0).
where cr is.
cr := arg min
c′∈Cav∪Chv
{dγ(pt(c′), pγ) :
dγ(pt(c
′), pγ) > 0}.
The first rule for HVs ensures that once the nearest lead vehicle
brakes rapidly, an HV is able to stop before hitting the lead
vehicle. To respect the difference in communication capabili-
ties, the first rule does not differentiate between whether the
lead vehicle is an HV or AV. The second rule governs how
an HV behaves based on signal light status. We highlight here
that when the signal light turns to amber, an HV will still
plan to pass through the intersection if its current speed and
position do not allow a safe stop before entering AI ; otherwise,
it prepares to stop before entering AI . The third rule governs
how an HV turns right safely, when there is no signal light.
Since a right-turn path has a collision area with only one
another path, the third rule specifically checks other vehicles
on that path. In view the fact that AVs may suddenly change
speed, an adjustment of observed speed is added to the safe
separation distance.
B. Safe Motion Protocol for AVs
As mentioned in Section IV, AVs are expected to send
path requests to the IM after entering AC . After receiving
a decision from IM, AVs adjust their movement through their
motion protocol. In this subsection, we first present the design
of the AV controller and then propose a motion protocol for
AVs to stay safe. We propose a Model Predictive Control
(MPC) based motion planner for AVs in combination with
safety constraints. Given vt−h, the velocity of an AV in time
slot [t − h, t), the target of the MPC based controller is to
decide control inputs for the time slot [t, t+ h). Then motion
protocol adjusts the controller by imposing different safety
constraint. Usually the safety constraints that maintains a safe
separation distance from the nearest lead vehicle is imposed.
If the motion protocol indicates that the AV should stop before
entering AI , then additional safety constraints that guide the
AV to stop at pγ will be imposed in exchange. We will show
that under the proposed architecture and protocols, it is enough
for each AV to follow one possibly virtual “reference object”
for safety. The “reference object” can be the nearest vehicle or
the cross-point of the γ(c) and AI . Denote by vrot and p
ro
t the
sampled velocity and position of the reference object at time
t. Motion protocol achieves the goal of adjusting controller
majorly through changing the reference object.
We employ the following MPC to determine the movement
of an AV within AC .
MPC for AVs within AC
min
u(0:N−1)
J(xt,x
f
t,u(0 : N − 1)) (3)
s.t. xt+(k+1)h = f(xt+kh,ut+kh)
dγ(pt+(k+1)h, p
ro
t+(k+1)h) > s∗∗(vt+kh, vrot+kh)
dγ(p
ro
t+kh, p
ro
t+(k+1)h) = (v
ro
t+(k−1)h + a
∗
minh)h
dγ(pt+kh, pt+(k+1)h) = vt+khh
ωt+kh = vt+kh/ρt+kh
vt+kh ∈ [vt+kh, vt+kh]
vt+kh := max{0, vt+(k−1)h + a∗minh}
vt+kh := min{vmax, vt+(k−1)h + amaxh}
θmin ≤ θt+(k+1)h ≤ θmax,
for all k ∈ {0, ..., N − 1}, where u(0 : N − 1) =
{ut, ...,ut+(N−1)h}, N is the length of the time horizon,
and xft+kh is the target state set for time t + kh. The cost
function J is allowed to be arbitrary, since our guarantee of
safety depends only on the existence of a feasible solution to
the MPC, and not on the objective function or its value. The
separation distance s∗∗(·, ·) for AVs is also designed to ensure
that, even if its lead vehicle brakes rapidly, it can stop before
hitting its lead vehicle.
The motion protocol needs to ensure the safety of AVs in
the multiple scenarios shown in Fig. 4. Since we do not require
that an HV differentiates between the type of its lead vehicle
and do not require that it takes into account any vehicles that
are following it, thus we enforce that an AV to behave like an
HV (not decelerate more than ahvmin) if it is followed by an
HV. Such an AV is referred to as a “virtual HV” (VHV) and is
treated as HV in s∗∗(·, ·). Thus, as shown in Fig. 4(a,b), a∗min =
ahvmin when an AV is followed by an HV/VHV, and, as shown
in Fig. 4(c,d) a∗min = a
av
min when an AV is followed by another
AV. At the same time, however, the AV may be following yet
another AV that can decelerate at aavmin. Therefore, s
∗
∗(·, ·) the
lower bound on distance between an AV and its lead vehicle
depends on the type of vehicles the AV is following (specified
by the superscript of s∗∗(·, ·)), as well as the type of vehicle it
is followed by (specified by the subscript of s∗∗(·, ·)). Covering
all these cases, all possible s∗∗(·, ·) are given below:
savav(vt−h, v
ro
t−h) := 1(vt−h > v
ro
t−h)
{ (vt−h)2 − (vrot−h)2
−2aavmin
+ (vt−h − vrot−h)h−
1
2
aavminh
2
}
+ smin,
(4)
shvav(vt−h, v
ro
t−h) := 1(vt−h > v
ro
t−h + a
hv
minh/2)
{
(vt−h − vrot−h − ahvminh/2)2
−2(aavmin − ahvmin)
+ (vt−h − vrot−h)h
− 1
2
aavminh
2 − 1
2
ahvminh
2
}
+ smin, (5)
shvhv(vt−h, v
ro
t−h) := 1(vt−h > v
ro
t−h + a
hv
minh/2)
{
v2t−h − (vrot−h + ahvminh/2)2
−2ahvmin
+ (vt−h − vrot−h)h
− ahvminh2
}
+ vmaxT
hv
r + smin, (6)
savhv(vt−h, v
ro
t−h) := 1(vt−h >
√
ahvmin
aavmin
vrot−h)
{ v2t−h
−2ahvmin
−
(vrot−h)
2
−2aavmin
+ (vt−h − vrot−h)h−
1
2
ahvminh
2
}
+ vmaxT
hv
r + smin. (7)
We observe that different from [23], whose safe separa-
tion distance grows polynomially with velocity ds(vt−h) =
v2t−h/(−2aavmin) + vt−hh − aavminh2/2 > v2t−h/ − 2aavmin,
our separation distance savav(vt−h, v
ro
t−h) can be as small as
smin, independent of velocity. This property makes the MPC
amenable to platooning [15]. Actually ds(vt−h) can be viewed
as a special case of savav(vt−h, v
ro
t−h) when v
ro
t−h = 0.
Fig. 4. Multiple traffic scenarios. An AVis represented by an icon with a WiFi
symbol. The vehicle with dashed square is “own vehicle” whose viewpoint
and behavior are discussed in the test.
We assume reasonably that dC ≥ v2max/−2ahvmin+vmaxh−
ahvminh
2/2 + vmaxT
hv
r + smin, i.e., if an AV that is followed
by an HV/VHV enters AC with velocity vmax, it still can stop
before entering AI . Otherwise, it is impossible for those AVs.
We observe that when an AV is following an HV, vrot−h is the
momentary velocity of its lead HV at t − h, as HVs enjoy
the freedom to change their control input ay any time during
[t − h, t). Consequently in the t-round MPC for that AV, the
velocity of lead HV is taken as vrot−h + a
hv
minh/2 in equations
(5-6), i.e., the estimated average velocity for time [t−h, t). We
also observe that although the result from the t-th epoch MPC
(the MPC whose initial time is t) is a plan for a longer time
horizon, we only implement it for the first time slot [t, t+h).
Fig. 5. Information flow between permission assignment and signal color
determination.
The motion protocol for AVs is given below.
Protocol 1. Motion Protocol for AVs
An AV c ∈ Cav follows the following motion protocol
to adjust its MPC based controller:
1) If the request of c is permitted by the IM, then c
follows the nearest lead vehicle cro with safe sepa-
ration distance s∗∗(vt−h(c), vt−h(c
ro)) in equations
(4-7) depending on which scenario c is in. cro is
determined through
cro := arg min
c′∈Cc(t)
{dγ(c)(pt(c), pt(c′)) :
dγ(c)(pt(c), pt(c
′)) > 0}.
2) If the request of c has not been permitted by the
IM, then c maintains a safe separation distance
from its nearest lead vehicle while preparing to stop
before entering AI . Correspondingly, we add one
additional constraints to Equation (3):
dγ(pt+(k+1)h, pγ) > s∗∗(vt+kh, 0).
C. Safe Intersection Management for a Mix of AVs and HVs
Lacking communication capability and ability to follow
complex commands are the major issues for HVs. Information
can only be communicated to HVs through traffic lights, and
no information or acknowledgements can be obtained from
them. This greatly increases the uncertainty surrounding HVs
in traffic management. In contrast, as shown in Fig. 3, IM taken
on their request to pass through the intersection, can collect
acknowledgements from AVs. Handling the uncertainty vis-
vis HVs impairs the throughput of intersections, since when
an intersection is not sure about an HV’s plan, it needs to
make a worst estimate to guarantee safety. The objective our
traffic management scheme is to guarantee safety of mixed
traffic while simultaneously achieving greater throughput as
possible.
As discussed in Section III, AVs send their state and a
request to pass-through after they enter AC . The received
vehicle state for AVs consists of their position information
pt, and control inputs for the last time slot ut−h. At the
same time, an HV’s state is obtained through roadside sensors.
Paths to follow for HVs are obtained through their turn
signaling. Given this totality of information, the IM permits
path requests of AVs by following the permission assignment
policy. Considering that processing requests from AVs takes
time, we suppose that the IM processes the requests received
during [t− h, t) at t. Permissions of those request are sent to
corresponding AVs after t. Denote by Pavt the set of AVs that
the IM grants permissions to before time t. Denote by Phvt the
set of HVs IM plans to grant permission before time t. This
means that the IM-ISL coordination protocol will enforce the
corresponding signal light to be green until some permitted
HV enters AI .
The process above will introduce uncertainty as other HVs,
on the same lane may think they are permitted to enter as well
and may not be able to safely stop before AI after the light
changes. The IM therefore needs to take that uncertainty into
account. Denote by Cunt an estimate of those “uncertain” HVs;
then:
Cunt := {c ∈ Chv : `γ(c)(t− h) = g ∧ dγ(c)(pt(c), pγ(c))
< shv(max(vt−h(c) + amaxh, vmax), 0)}. (8)
Cunt contains those HVs that may be unable to stop before AI
in the next time slot [t, t+h) once their corresponding signal
light turns to amber. In the definition of Cunt , we conservatively
use max(vt−h(c) + amaxh, vmax) since the estimated present
velocity as that is the maximum achievable velocity for the
HV at time t. Although Cunt overestimates the set of uncertain
HVs and may impair throughput, it is necessary to guarantee
safety. Denote by Cet the set of vehicles that exited AI before
t; then we have:
Cet :={c ∈ C : dγ(c)(pt(c), pγ(c)) < 0 ∧
pt(c) /∈ AI}. (9)
Now we describe the permission assignment policy be-
low.
Policy 2. Permission Assignment Policy
Suppose that AVs send requests for paths to the IM once
they enter AC . At time t, given Pavt−h, Phvt−h, Cunt , and
additional path requests received during [t−h, t), the IM
follows the following steps to determine Pavt , Phvt .
1) Initialize by still permitting already-permitted vehi-
cles and remove those that already exited:
Pavt = Pavt−h \ Cet ,
Phvt = Phvt−h \ Cet .
2) Sort pending requests (including new requests re-
ceived during [t − h, t) and un-permitted requests
until t) based on the present distance from vehicles
to the intersection: the closer to intersection, the
lower the requests rank.
3) Process the requests from low rank to high rank:
for an AV c with a request for path γ(c), if γ(c) ∩
γ(c′) = ∅ for any c′ ∈ Pavt ∪ Phvt ∪ Cunt , then:
Pavt = Pavt ∪ c.
4) For each HV c ∈ Cuv , Phvt = Phvt ∪c as long as one
of the following conditions holds: (a) γ(c′)∩γ(c) =
∅ for any c′ ∈ Pavt ∪ Phvt ∪ Cunt ; (b) there exists
cf ∈ Pavt ∪ Cunt , where cf satisfies:
γ(c) = γ(cf ),
dγ(c)(pt(c), pt(c
f )) < 0.
The first step in the permission assignment policy ensures
once IM assigns a permission to a vehicle for some time slot,
it will keep permitting the vehicle in the following time slots
until the vehicle exits AI . The second step guarantees that the
vehicles closer to AI enjoy higher priority. This is to improve
management efficiency as and reduce delay. The third step
indicates IM only grants permission to a request when the
requested path will not collide with any previously permitted
requests as well as uncertain HVs. This is the major difference
between the proposed approach in this paper and previous
studies, i.e., uncertainty of HVs is considered in management
based on HV dynamics and physical constraints. In the fourth
step, IM will plan to permit HVs if they are followed by
some permitted AVs or their paths are collision-free with all
permitted paths. We will discuss how to take use of this in
IM-ISL coordination protocol.
After the permission assignment policy determines Phvt , it
needs to notify the relevant HVs through traffic signal lights.
Therefore, an approach to determine the color of signal lights
based on the outputs of permissions assignment is necessary.
This is handled by IM-ISL coordination protocol. After the
planned permission to HVs are implicitly declared through
signal lights, more uncertainty will emerge since HVs that
are not planned to permit by the IM may misunderstand the
green lights as a signal of permission. This uncertainty will
be handled in the next-round of permission assignment for
system safety. The entire interaction process is presented in
Fig. 5. The IM-ISL Coordination Protocol is presented below.
Protocol 2. IM-ISL Coordination Protocol
Given Phvt and Cunt , signal light colors are determined
by the following protocol, for any γ ∈ Γ:
1) `γ(t) cyclically changes to g, a, and r as t increases.
2) `γ(t) = g if there exists a vehicle c such that γ(c) =
γ and c ∈ Phvt .
3) `γ(t) changes to a if there exists a vehicle c with
γ(c) = γ and c ∈ Cunt \ Phvt .
4) `γ(t) = r if for any HV c that has γ(c) = γ, there
exists c /∈ Cunt ∪ Phvt .
For an HV c, represent the relationship that c maintains a
safe separation distance from the nearest vehicle at time t0 by
cSt0cl, i.e., dγ(c)(pt0(c), pt0(cl)) ≥ shv(vt0(c), vt0(cl)).
We now outline the results that provide the safety guaran-
tees.
Lemma 1. Suppose at initial time t0, there are no HVs
inside AH . For each HV c about to enter AH and its
nearest lead vehicle cl, one has cSt0cl. If all vehicles are
HVs, the intersection signal lights are operated by Policy
1, and HVs move under Rule 1, then all HVs are safe at
any time after t0, i.e., cStcl holds for every HV c and
any t > t0.
Proof. As all vehicles are HVs, Rule 1.1 ensures
dγ(c)(pt(c), pt(c
l)) ≥ shv(vt(c), vt(cl)) at any t > t0. It is
easy to verify that shv(·, ·) is enough for the following vehicle
to stop before hitting the lead vehicle if the lead vehicle
brakes with ahvmin. If γ(c) ∈ Γr, since dH > shv(vmax, 0), c
is able to stop before entering AI safely. Rule 1.3 guarantees
that crStc and cStcl. If γ(c) ∈ Γ \ Γr, Policy 1.1 guarantees
that at any time, there will only be collision-free paths that
are permitted. Therefore, under the constraints of the lemma,
we have cStcl holds for any HV c and any t > t0.
For an AV c, represent the relationship that c maintains a
safe separation distance from its reference object at time t0
by cSt0cro, i.e., dγ(c)(pt0(c), prot0 ) ≥ s∗∗(vt0−h, vrot0−h).
Lemma 2. Suppose at initial time t0, there are no AVs
within AC . For each AV c about to enter AC and its
reference object cro, one has cSt0cro. The AVs are
safe at every time t > t0, if AVs adjust their MPC
controller through Protocol 1 and permission assignment
is collision-free, i.e., for any c, if c receives permission,
γ(c)∩γ(c′) = ∅ for each c′ that also receives permission.
Proof. This lemma considers a mixed traffic scenario. First,
the permission assignment is assumed to be collision-
free. Under that assumption, Protocol 1. handles the mixed
traffic scenarios in Fig. 4. Suppose the initial condition
dγ(c)(pt0(c), p
ro
t0 ) ≥ s∗∗(vt0−h, vrot0−h) is satisfied. Since
vrot0 > max{0, vrot0−h + a∗minh}, there always exists
dγ(c)(pt0+h(c), p
ro
t0+h
) ≥ s∗∗(vt0−h+a∗minh, vrot0 ). That means
that once the initial conditions are satisfied, deceleration with
a∗min is always a feasible solution for MPC problem (3) for any
AV. Therefore, cSt0cro indicates cStcro for any t > t0.
Lemma 3. Suppose we follow Policy 2 to assign permis-
sions for requests, Phvt ∪Pavt ∪Cunt are collision-free, i.e.,
for any ci, cj in Phvt ∪Pavt ∪Cunt , one has γci∩γcj = ∅.
Proof. As in Step 3) and Step 4) of Policy 2, before providing
permission to a new path, the IM will always check whether
the path conflicts with any already-permitted paths.
Lemma 4. Suppose we follow Protocol 2 to determine
the colors of the intersection signal lights. Then the way
that signal lights are operated satisfies all constraints in
Policy 2.
Proof. Protocol 2.1 also lets `γ(t) cyclically change to g,
a, and r as t increases. Meanwhile, from Protocol 2.2-2.3,
paths whose signal lights are green or amber are all from
Phvt ∪ Cunt ⊂ Phvt ∪ Pavt ∪ Cunt , which are collision-free as
noted in Lemma 3. That means they satisfy the constraint of
Policy 2.1. In addition, from Protocol 2.3, Cunt \Phvt contains
those HVs that may fail to stop safely before AI based on
worst estimation. In fact, it is a tighter constraints than Policy
2.2. Thus the way that signal lights are operated satisfies all
constraints of Policy 2.
Theorem 1. Suppose at initial time t0, there are no
vehicles inside AC . Then for each HV c about to enter
AH and the its nearest lead vehicle cl, one has cSt0cl. For
each AV c′ about to enter AC and its reference object cro,
there exists c′St0cro. If (1) all HVs move under Rules 1,
(2) AVs adjust their MPC controller through Protocol 1,
(3) the permission assignments follow Policy 2, and (4)
the colors of traffic signal lights are determined through
Protocol 2, then all HVs and AVs are safe at every time
after t0, i.e., cStcl and c′Stcro holds for any HV c and
any AV c′ at any t > t0.
Proof. As indicated by Lemma 1, if all other vehicles move
like HVs, the HVs can stay safe by following Rule 1 while
the signal lights operation respects the constraints from Policy
1. Meanwhile, it has been shown in Lemma 2 that AVs are
able to maintain a safe separation distance from their lead
vehicles through Protocol 2, and behave like HVs when they
are followed by HVs. As long as the permission assignments
are collision free, then AVs are safe. Lemmas 3 and 4 directly
demonstrate that the permission assignments (Policy 2) for
AVs is collision-free and, at the same time, the signal lights
operated through Protocol 2 satisfy the constraints in Policy
1. Therefore, the whole system is safe as long as all the
assumptions in the theorem are valid.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Motivated by the fact that there will be a transition period
when both human-driven vehicles and autonomous vehicles
coexist in intersections, we have addressed the problem of
design of provably safe intersection management for mixed
transportation systems. The approach we follow considers
a loose model of human behavior that permits worst case
behavior, and a tight models for autonomous vehicles. We
design a MPC controller for AVs and simple rules for HVs.
We propose an architecture for intersection management con-
sisting of permission assignments and traffic lights operation.
We also design coordination protocols between permission
assignment for AVs and color change of traffic lights for HVs.
In the proposed approach, we take into account the differ-
ences between AVs and HVs in control freedom, command
complexity, braking response and communication capability.
To be compatible with human expectations and behavior, the
rules and signal lights operation for HVs are close to what is
currently used in traffic. Our work can be extended to more
general scenario where vehicles with heterogeneous levels
of autonomy as well as resultant uncertainty are operated.
For instance, vehicles that can measure states through sen-
sors, vehicles that can communicate through V2I and V2V
communication, vehicles that can be directly controlled by
intersections etc.
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